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GENERAL REPORT OF THE CLEVELAND PREPARATORY COLLOQUIUM*
Nikos Passas†
The Case Western Reserve University School of Law’s Institute for 
Global Security Law & Policy and the International Association of Penal 
Law sponsored the “World Conference on Combating Terrorist Financing” 
from April 10-11, 2008. The symposium, held at the Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio, was part of the Preparatory 
Colloquium for the Eighteenth International Congress of Penal Law. Repre-
sentatives from each country participating in the Colloquium were asked to 
submit a “country report” summarizing laws aimed at combating terrorist 
financing in their respective countries. This General Report synthesizes the 
individual country reports and provides overall recommendations about 
how to combat terrorist financing around the world. The General Report 
considers country reports from the following countries: Argentina, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Croatia, France, Germany, Guinea, Italy, Hungary, Japan, 
Poland, Romania, and the United States.   
INTRODUCTION
The international community accorded high priority to the issue of 
terrorist finance in the 1990s as evidenced by the General Assembly Resolu-
tion 51/210,1 and more importantly, by the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.2
It is beyond doubt that financial controls against the financing of 
terrorism are useful and necessary. They perform a number of functions, 
including the reduction of possible harm caused by terrorist operations and 
attacks. Financial controls also facilitate the monitoring of militant activities 
so that preventive actions can be taken. They also enable the reconstruction 
 *  This Report was originally published by the International Association of Penal Law. 
General Report, 79 INT’L REV. OF PENAL L. 325 (2008), available at http://www.penal.org 
(subscription only). 
 †  Professor, College of Criminal Justice, Northeastern University.  
1 See G.A. Res. 51/210, ¶ 3(f), U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996).  
2 See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 
1999, 39 I.L.M. 270.  
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of events and the detection of co-conspirators who can then be pursued. 
Moreover, the knowledge that all types of financial activities are under scru-
tiny forces extremist groups to make frequent tactical changes and engage in 
communications, which generates valuable opportunities for intelligence 
gathering. 
The Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
gained new life after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States of 
America. In the aftermath of 9/11, numerous initiatives and measures sup-
plemented this convention.  What was previously known as anti-money 
laundering (AML) speedily expanded to also include countering terrorist 
finance (AML/CFT). 
The new acronym reflected the consideration of the two types of ac-
tivities as similar in at least many important respects, thereby justifying not 
only the parallel treatment of money laundering and terrorist finance for 
policy responses but also the application of largely the same legislative and 
regulatory tools against both activities. As seen in national reports received, 
this occasionally identical treatment gives rise to difficulties and calls for a 
thoughtful reconsideration of existing national and international measures. 
National CFT laws and measures grew in number, scope and geo-
graphic application due to Financial Action Task Force (FATF), U.N., E.U., 
and other initiatives, including some springing from national levels. Lists of 
designated suspected terrorists were created and circulated and assets of 
those named in such lists were frozen, including those of non-profit organi-
zations. Laws were introduced regarding terrorist finance and material sup-
port for terrorism.  
Several heated debates accompanied these developments, including 
the process by which suspects’ names are placed on a designation list and 
how should the names of those found innocent be removed from them. In 
some instances, the process of removal is unclear, while no judicial or other 
legal process addresses the status of a suspect on such lists; that is, there is 
frequently no criminal or other charge, no court proceeding and, in essence, 
no means for a judicial determination of guilt or innocence of named sus-
pects. Nevertheless, the effects of executive decisions made on the basis of 
not fully known or transparent criteria and evidence are devastating for 
those affected. Concerns about due process and transparency are reflected in 
recent lawsuits, court rulings, opinions and authorities in a significant num-
ber of U.N. member states.3 They are also echoed in the national reports 
3 See e.g., Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Bara-
kaat International Foundation v. Council of the E.U. and Commission of the E.C. (E.C.J. 
Judgment), Sept. 3, 2008, available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm; A, K, 
M, Q, & G v. H.M. Treasury, [2008] EWHC 869 (Admin) (Eng.), available at
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/judgments_guidance/a_k_m_q_g.pdf; Rosemary Foot, The
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received for this project, which accompany calls for a fundamental re-
thinking and redesign of the international and national CFT arrangements 
on the basis of long-standing, universal principles of criminal and human 
rights law as well as on the basis of evidence and facts relative to the financ-
ing of terrorism in general and with respect to particular extremist groups. 
Unfortunately, the factual questions on terrorism finance are hard to 
answer due to the lack of systematic collection and analysis of reliable in-
formation at national and international levels. This problem has led to a 
collective call from the national representatives for the creation of a data-
base.4
The following countries sent reports that have been taken into con-
sideration: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Croatia, France, Germany, 
Guinea, Italy, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Romania and the United States.5 In 
addition, we have received a report on the European Union. Moreover, an 
oral presentation on the situation in Mexico at the preparatory colloquium 
and reporting on other countries from external sources have also been con-
sidered.
In broad terms, this paper follows answers to the general questions 
raised in the questionnaire and which could be addressed during the forth-
coming Congress. 
I. EMPIRICAL ASPECTS
Authors of national reports had difficulties in finding information 
on the number of cases or methods of terrorism finance in their country. 
While most countries collect statistics on suspicious activity/transaction 
reports (SAR/STR), the dearth of detailed information affects law-making, 
policy and international cooperation. With the exception of very few coun-
tries, which offered some descriptions of suspicious activities, there is no 
concerted initiative to find out how the financing of terrorism takes place, 
how often, whether methods have changed overtime, for what amounts and 
for which particular terrorist groups.  
Although the Belgian and Romanian reports outlined several trans-
actions and cases, these were not proven terrorism finance cases, but rather, 
requests for investigation from other governments on the basis of undis-
closed information and reported suspicious transaction (STRs), which need 
United Nations, Counter Terrorism, and Human Rights: Institutional Adaptation and Em-
bedded Ideas, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 489, 489–514 (2007).  
4 See Draft Resolution: Cleveland Preparatory Colloquium, 79 INT’L REV. OF PENAL L.
371(2008), available at http://www.penal.org (subscription only), reprinted in 41 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 263 (2009).  
5 For the individual country reports, see Cleveland Preparatory Colloquium, 79 INT’L
REV. OF PENAL L. (annex) (2008), available at http://www.penal.org (subscription only). 
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to be followed up and confirmed. If this does not occur, the continuing repe-
tition of such reports may serve to perpetuate certain preconceived ideas. 
Romania appears to take this issue seriously and seeks to take into account 
empirical and scientific methods in the fight against terrorism. Media and 
other accounts are frequently unsupported, sensational and biased. Intelli-
gence is not always correctly interpreted or corroborated leading to errors in 
accurately identifying financiers of terrorism. Hungary reported, for exam-
ple, that it expelled one of its own citizens only to discover subsequently 
that the case was unfounded.  
France, on the other hand, has reported that most terrorism finance 
(TF) cases can be characterized as “micro-finance,” whereby terrorist opera-
tions are funded for comparatively petty crimes. This reality, however, con-
trasts sharply with TF measures that are generally devised to target very 
high amounts of money, because they are modelled largely after money 
laundering measures (see below). 
The United States reports the existence of a “Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program,” which aims at identifying and disrupting terrorist net-
works. Yet, even there, law enforcement agencies do not systematically 
collect and analyze data on terrorists’ use of all possible mechanisms and 
methods. So, there is no information on the number of detected terrorism 
financing cases and no breakdown of such cases by funding source, includ-
ing non-Western and informal networks. As a result, controllers cannot 
conduct a complete and systematic analysis of trends and patterns from their 
own case data, which undercuts risk assessment and prioritization efforts. 
So, even the few national reports that refer to some modus operandi 
do not rely on any comprehensive and systematic effort to collect and ana-
lyze verified information. Rather, they refer to suspected cases, anecdotal 
intelligence and unconfirmed connections to terrorism. Imperfect know-
ledge and stereotypes undermine policy-making and thereby security, the 
rule of law, and justice. 
In the light of concerns and issues raised throughout the interna-
tional community, there is an urgent need for evidence-based threat assess-
ments and appropriate legal responses. We need a systematic effort to col-
lect, validate, and make available empirical data that clearly illustrate the 
nature of terrorism finance and the ways in which laws or other measures 
are implemented to address the threats. As a result, the creation of a publicly 
available database is called for. This type of initiative would be able to fur-
nish valid information, enable evidence-based policies, and make an ex-
tremely useful contribution to enhanced security. 
II. RATIFICATION OF UNIVERSAL AND REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS; LEGAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL NATIONAL FRAMEWORK
All countries that reported have ratified the United Nations 1999 In-
ternational Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
2009] REPORT OF THE CLEVELAND COLLOQUIUM 247
and many of the other universal terrorism conventions. Under this conven-
tion, the offense of terrorist financing is committed, if one “by any means, 
directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects funds 
with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are 
to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out an act which constitutes an 
offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the 
annex,”6 or by any act “intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a 
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an in-
ternational organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”7
The implementation and enforcement of terrorism and terrorism fi-
nance laws, however, suffers from the lack of uniform definitions of both 
terms. The difficulty of defining “terrorism” is well-known and the subject 
of intense discussions prompting many observers to argue for the introduc-
tion of a new terrorism convention aiming at the universal definition of the 
term.  
Some countries, such as Japan and Guinea do not even attempt to 
define terrorism. Italy also does not define international terrorism. The 
United States defines differently the terms “terrorism” and “international 
terrorism.” The former refers to “premeditated, politically motivated vi-
olence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”8 The latter is 
defined as activities that: 
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, 
or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the juris-
diction of the United States or of any State;  
(B) appear to be intended— 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion; or  
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruc-
tion, assassination, or kidnapping; and  
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Unit-
ed States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means 
by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended
6 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism art. 9, Dec. 
9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 
7 Id. art. 2.  
8 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (West 2009). 
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to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators op-
erate or seek asylum.9
Romanian law considers terrorism as acts or threats that pose public 
danger, affect national security, and have the following characteristics: are 
premeditated, motivated by extremist beliefs or attitudes, employ violent 
and/or destructive means, are committed in pursuit of political objectives, 
target persons, public institutions and their belongings, and have a powerful 
psychological impact, in order to draw attention over the political objec-
tives.10
Under French law, acts of terrorism are those included in the long 
list of Article 421-1 of the penal code, if committed intentionally in relation 
to an individual or collective endeavor aiming at seriously undermining the 
public order by intimidation or terror. 
In Austria, terms such as “terrorist group,” “terrorist offences,” and 
“terrorist financing” are all defined in the Criminal Code in accordance with 
definitions contained in the E.U.  Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on 
combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA).11 An interesting example of practical 
difficulties created by definitional issues is offered by Germany. In Germa-
ny, since the legal definition of a “terrorist group” requires three or more 
persons, the law could not be applied to the two-person terrorist attempt to 
place a suitcase filled with explosives in a train in the summer of 2006.12
Similar definitional issues affect policies against the financing of 
terrorism as well. These are discussed in more detail in the section devoted 
to penal measures below. In short, the national reports show that some 
countries have a detailed separate incrimination, while others treat it is a 
preparatory act of terrorism or under conspiracy laws. In some countries, the 
laws are out of date and in need of amendments. In other countries, terror-
ism finance is almost the same as money laundering. In other countries, the 
term is used very broadly covering so many acts that legal challenges have 
been brought in courts—some successfully. Other countries do not define it 
at all, but consider it as participation in terrorism.  
The institutional framework employed in the past to address ques-
tions of money laundering is essentially the same for terrorism finance, with 
financial intelligence units (FIUs) having responsibility for the collection 
and analysis of reports from financial institutions and the private sector.13
9 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (West 2009). 
10 Lege Nr. 535/2004 [Law No. 535/2004] art. 1 (Romania). 
11 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Bundesgesetzblatt art. 278b-d (Austria). 
12 Interview with author (on file with author).  
13 In Austria, however, there is a separate entity dealing with counterterrorism, including 
CFT. Roland Miklau, Austria National Report: Cleveland Preparatory Colloquium, 79 INT’L
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However, some law enforcement agencies have created special units to look 
specifically into terrorism finance.14
III. PREVENTION OF TERRORISM FINANCE
The general AML approach regarding registration and licensing, 
customer identification and due diligence, etc. apply to terrorism finance as 
well. Because there has been no insight into what transactions are indicative 
of terrorism finance, the practice internationally has been to check clients 
against lists of suspected and designated terrorist persons. Many countries 
are still in the process of enhancing their AML/CFT rules and overall 
framework to more fully comply with international standards set by U.N. 
conventions (not only the one against the financing of terrorism but also 
those against transnational organized crime and against corruption) and the 
Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force.15 The proper identi-
fication of clients is particularly challenging when it comes to illegal mi-
grants who cannot have official documents issued by the host country. In 
response, Mexico and some Central American governments have issued 
their own identification documents States (matricula consular) for nationals 
present in the United States of America. 
There is marked diversity among countries on which institutions are 
subject to these rules and frameworks. The applicability of CFT measures 
varies from financial institutions to other private sector entities and a range 
of professional categories. Countries with expanding lists of covered sectors 
and professional categories include Argentina, Japan, and the United States, 
but most markedly are Belgium and France,16 which take certain risk factors 
into account (e.g., notary public, accounting professionals, casinos, invest-
ment companies, real estate agents, precious stone traders, art traders, etc.). 
Such expansions also reflect the Directive of the European Parliament and 
Council (Dec. 4, 2001) aiming at the coverage of all serious crimes includ-
REV. OF PENAL L. (annex) 15–21 (2008), available at http://www.penal.org (subscription 
only). 
14 Such as the Terrorism Finance Operations Section (TFOS) at the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) in the U.S. and the National Terrorism Financial Investigative Unit 
(NTFIU) in the U.K. See, e.g., Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering Investigations: 
Who Investigates and How Effective are They?, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 
(2004) (statement of Michael F. A. Morehart, FBI Counterterrorism Division), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/morehart051104.htm.  
15 See, e.g., Guinea National Report: Cleveland Preparatory Colloquium, 79 INT’L REV.
OF PENAL L. (annex) 145–55 (2008), available at http://www.penal.org (subscription only). 
16 See National Reports of Argentina, Belgium, France Japan, and the United States, 
Cleveland Preparatory Colloquium, 79 INT’L REV. OF PENAL L. (annex) (2008), available at
http://www.penal.org (subscription only). 
250 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:243 
ing terrorism finance, organized crime, and frauds against the financial in-
terests of the European Union. 
Bank secrecy laws and practices are quite diverse ranging from no 
such laws at all (e.g., Belgium does not have stricto sensu bank secrecy) to 
several countries reporting no practical problems so far, but theoretical pos-
sibilities of such rules impeding investigations or international cooperation 
in the future (see, for example, Croatia). Brazil, on the other hand, reports 
that, despite the 2001 bank secrecy law, bank confidentiality still limits the 
ability of stock exchange supervisors to fully monitor the sector and share 
all information with foreign counterparts. Although financial institutions 
must identify the owners and controllers of corporate accounts, they are not 
required to identify the final beneficiary of these accounts or of payments of 
insurance benefits. 
The public-private interaction and cooperation is not uniform 
among countries. In some jurisdictions, such interactions are limited. Aus-
tria reports several good practices. After long-term debates, there are ex-
changes of information, training seminars and feedback between the finan-
cial sector and law enforcement authorities. Cooperation fora have also been 
set up and with annual strategic meetings. In addition, “the Supervisory 
Authority for the Financial Market” (Finanzmarktaufsicht—FMA), in coop-
eration with the competent branch of the Chamber of Commerce, has issued 
extensive guidelines and specific clarifications referring to the term “suspi-
cious transaction” and to the typologies of such transactions. The Ministry 
of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior have informed the police and judi-
cial authorities on new legal provisions, pertinent procedures and other is-
sues.”17
Extensive interactions are also reported from the United States: 
CFT authorities consult with the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group 
(BSAAG), which is comprised of representatives from the Treasury, Fin-
CEN, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy, various law enforcement agencies, financial regulatory 
agencies (including . . . state regulatory agencies) as well as financial ser-
vices industry representatives which are subject to BSA regulations (in-
cluding trade groups and practitioners). The Secretary of the Treasury or 
his designee(s) sends the BSAAG, for consideration and comment, infor-
mation concerning the administration and enforcement of the BSA and as-
sociated reporting requirements, and law enforcement’s use of such data. 
The BSAAG informs the participating private sector representatives about 
how law enforcement agencies make use of the filed reports. Based on this 
dialogue the BSAAG advises the Secretary of the Treasury on ways in 
17 Roland Miklau, Austria National Report: Cleveland Preparatory Colloquium, 79 INT’L
REV. OF PENAL L. (annex) 15–21  (2008), available at http://www.penal.org (subscription 
only). 
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which the reporting requirements could be modified to strengthen the 
ability of law enforcement agencies to use the information and/or to reduce 
the burden on reporting entities. Periodically regulators and law enforce-
ment have outreach efforts to engage the private sector in a dialogue on 
AML/CFT and related issues (export control and economic sanctions). 
There are a variety of financial sector, bar, and trade association groups 
that discuss policies and implementation thereof.18
Even in this context, however, there is plenty of room for improve-
ment, as the U.S. national report goes on to note:  
The longstanding debate that U.S. AML/CFT policies are not as effective 
as they could be insofar as they are unilateral has continued. An important 
debate is that many of the policies are intended for other countries and are 
not required in the U.S. This debate rages with respect to corporate forma-
tion and regulation, transparency of entities, PEPs, and gatekeepers. For 
instance, the U.S. applies PEPs regulations only to foreign and not domes-
tic PEPs. With respect to the gatekeeper regulations the U.S. government 
largely has not adopted any laws or regulations more than four years after 
the FATF June 2003 revised standards. In the private sector, the American 
College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC) is the only bar association 
to adopt AML good practice standards.19
In recent times, international organizations, policy-makers, and 
governments have been debating the respective benefits and shortcomings 
of principle-based and risk-based approaches to the implementation of pre-
ventive CFT measures.20 In general terms, the former involves the applica-
tion of certain rules and measures across the board, whereas the latter allows 
for some differentiation and stronger emphasis on areas of vulnerability. 
Austria, for instance, has been in favor of them since the beginning of AML 
policy debates. This preference was strengthened by the FMA guidelines 
and growing practical experience. 
This experience notwithstanding, as a result of the lack of in-depth 
information and analysis of risks and threats noted above, the identification 
of vulnerabilities and alerts to the private sector as well as controllers are 
inevitably hampered. So, while risk-based approaches are widely discussed, 
practically there is little guidance from authorities on how to execute them. 
18 Bruce Zagaris, U.S. National Report: Cleveland Preparatory Colloquium, 79 INT’L
REV. OF PENAL L. (annex) 271–99  (2008), available at http://www.penal.org (subscription 
only). 
19 Id.
20 See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO 
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HIGH LEVEL PRINCIPLES AND 
PROCEDURES 3 (2007). 
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The listing of suspected terrorists or supporters for the purpose of 
refusing financial services, reporting suspicious transactions or freezing and 
confiscating assets has been widely practiced, but significant concerns about 
due process and constitutional issues as fundamental rights of suspects are 
not always observed. These are particularly worrying in the light of repeated 
mistaken identification of suspects who have nevertheless suffered conse-
quences of administrative sanctions more severe than those possible follow-
ing criminal convictions. Questions of human rights and democratic ap-
proaches to counter-terrorism are echoed throughout. 
Strong arguments have been advanced for the reform of designation 
practices and standards and for judicial review and transparency. Current 
practices of executive decisions leading to long-term (punitive/deterrent) 
sanctions without trial or even formal accusations/charges are viewed as an 
issue that must be addressed thoughtfully and in accordance with interna-
tional legal principles. 
Perceptions of risk have led to significant preventive and other in-
itiatives in the financial sector, informal value and fund transfer systems 
(IVTS)—which refers to ways in which value can be transferred either 
without leaving easily identifiable traces or entirely outside the formal fi-
nancial system21—and non-profit organizations. The absence of comprehen-
sive and valid evidence, analysis and useful guidance has led to very asym-
metric and uncoordinated approaches that may be missing the most impor-
tant targets. 
21 See NIKOS PASSAS, INFORMAL VALUE TRANSFER SYSTEMS AND CRIMINAL
ORGANIZATIONS: A STUDY INTO SO-CALLED UNDERGROUND BANKING NETWORKS (1999), 
available at http://www.apgml.org/frameworks/docs/8/Informal%20Value%20Transfer%20S
ystems%20-%20Passas.pdf. See generally Nikos Passas, Hawala and Other Informal Value 
Transfer Systems: How to Regulate Them?, 5 J. RISK MGMT. 39, 39–49 (2003); NIKOS 
PASSAS, INFORMAL VALUE TRANSFER SYSTEMS, TERRORISM AND MONEY LAUNDERING: A
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (2005), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pd
ffiles1/nij/grants/208301.pdf; Nikos Passas, Indicators of Hawala Operations and Criminal 
Abuse, 8 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL, 168–72 (2004); NIKOS PASSAS, INFORMAL VALUE 
TRANSFER SYSTEMS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES (2005), available at  http://english.wodc.nl/on
derzoeksdatabase/99.154a-underground-banking-systems-vervolg.aspx?nav=ra&l=geografi 
sch_gebied&l=azie; Mohamed el Qorchi et al., Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analy-
sis of the Informal Hawala System (Int’l Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 222, 2003); 
Lee Rensselaer, Terrorism Financing: The U.S. and International Response, Congressional 
Research Service Report (Dec. 6, 2002); Samuel. M. Maimbo, The Money Exchange Dealers 
of Kabul: A Study of the Informal Funds Transfer Market in Afghanistan (World Bank, 
Working Paper No. 13, 2003), available at  http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/html/amlcft/
docs/(06.23.03)%20The%20Hawala%20System%20in%20Afghanistan%20(Maimbo).pdf;FI
N. ACTION TASK FORCE, COMBATTING THE ABUSE OF ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE SYSTEMS:
INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES (2003), http://fatf-‘gafi.org/dataoecd/39/17/34033713.pdf; 
CHRISTINE HOWLETT, INVESTIGATION AND CONTROL OF MONEY LAUNDERING VIA 
ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE AND UNDERGROUND BANKING SYSTEMS (2001), http://www.ncjrs. 
gov/pdffiles1/190720.pdf.
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For instance, most countries have either no provisions regarding 
IVTS (such as hawala, hundi, fei chien, black market exchange networks) or 
subject them to the same regulation as formal institutions. In Austria, Brazil, 
and France, international remittances are only allowed through the formal 
banking system. Argentina acknowledges the existence of substantial in-
formal economic activity and Belgium reports suspicious transactions going 
through informal channels that may be connected to the funding of terror-
ism. Policy attention is therefore warranted. However, the approach taken 
by the United States and other countries applying the same rules to formal 
institutions and informal/ethnic money transfer companies and networks can 
be counterproductive, as it may result in less transparency and higher risks, 
if this makes informal operators shun authorities, go underground, and 
refuse to cooperate.22
Charitable organizations have also been targeted extensively, even 
though there is a lack of criminal prosecutions and convictions for terrorism 
charges. Many national reports refer to investigated cases but raise concerns 
about the accuracy of information and the legal process used. 
Comparatively neglected, on the other hand, are other economic 
spheres, such as the commercial sector, where vulnerabilities have been 
found to be very significant.23 Risk analysis and vulnerability assessments 
are therefore called for in order to establish priorities and allocation of re-
sources. 
IV. FREEZING OF ASSETS
Along with designation lists, the freezing of assets of those sus-
pected of supporting terrorist groups represents another frequently em-
ployed enforcement mechanism against the finance of terrorism after the 
9/11 attacks. In general, countries allow the freezing of assets of persons 
designated by the United Nations Security Council. Countries vary a great 
deal, however, as to the length of such measures and what they allow to be 
used or spent out of frozen assets for the needs of suspects. This is quite 
important because in the overwhelming majority of the cases, there is no 
criminal or other legal proceeding against those whose assets are frozen. 
The process of confiscation and use of confiscated assets also vary exten-
sively across countries with many requiring a prior criminal conviction. 
22 See Bruce Zagaris, supra note 18. See also Nikos Passas, Fighting Terror with Error: 
The Counter-Productive Regulation of Informal Value Transfers, 45 CRIME, L. AND SOC.
CHANGE, 315, 315–36 (2006). 
23 See Nikos Passas & Kimberly Jones, Commodities and Terrorist Financing: Focus on 
Diamonds, 12 EUR. J. CRIM. POL’Y & RES. 1, 9 (2006). See generally Nikos Passas, Setting 
Global CFT Standards: A Critique and Suggestions, 9 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 281 
(2006).
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Argentina, Japan, and the United States, for instance, do not allow 
the use of frozen funds for daily expenses or for legal costs faced by the 
owners of frozen assets. In Belgium, the Minister of Finance may authorize 
the use of frozen funds for basic living expenses, legal costs, management 
cost of these assets or for extraordinary expenses. In Brazil, the judge may 
allow a part of frozen assets to be used for the ordinary support of the sus-
pect and his family.24 Moreover, if criminal charges are not filed within a 
certain period or if the charges are ruled to be unfounded, the assets must be 
unfrozen. Interesting differentiations are found in Austria, where assets sub-
ject to E.U.  (National Bank) Regulations and assets frozen on the basis of a 
court order may be frozen indefinitely and independently of criminal 
charges. Freezing orders by the Criminal Investigation Agency (BK/FIU), 
on the other hand, may not exceed six months. 
Noteworthy is that the United States has both civil (in rem) and 
criminal (in personam) forfeiture systems, which provide for the forfeiture 
of instrumentalities and as well as the proceeds of an offense. The federal 
and state governments also can use administrative forfeiture in certain cir-
cumstances. 
Many countries have elaborate procedures in place for the unfreez-
ing of funds and possible reparation for those exonerated,25 but this has 
proven quite difficult in practice with respect to terrorism-related asset 
freezes. As echoed in several reports and reiterated in the Cleveland collo-
quium, it is worth emphasizing the fact that asset freezes are not criminal 
sanctions for proven law violations but temporary preventive measures. Yet, 
the effect of these preventive measures with regard to terrorism finance has 
been at times de facto punitive and devastating to those affected for ex-
tended periods of time without legal recourse. 
In additional legal and ethical considerations, there are practical 
questions regarding these measures. It would be important to know what has 
been the preventive effect against terrorism and terrorism finance. Cost-
benefit analyses are common in many areas of public policy. Cost-benefit 
analyses were recommended frequently in the past with respect to money 
laundering rules, but these have been largely abandoned in the aftermath of 
9/11. As the Italian national report observes, there are many laws and meas-
ures in place against the financing of terrorism, but there is no effort to as-
sess the cost-effectiveness of preventive and other policies. Consequently, 
we do not know at which point we may over-shoot and reach a point of di-
minishing returns at national and international levels. Several authors of 
24 Código de Processo Penal [C.P.P.] art. 137 (Braz.). 
25 See National Reports of Belgium, France, and the United States, Cleveland Preparatory 
Colloquium, 79 INT’L REV. OF PENAL L. (annex) (2008), available at http://www.penal.org 
(subscription only). 
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national reports recognize this point and call for a thoughtful examination of 
policy effects for maximum returns and enhanced security. 
V. PENAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
A.  Penal Laws 
The national reports, consistently with other research efforts, show 
that there is no uniform legal approach to CFT. With respect to definitions 
of terrorism finance, sanctions, treatment of victims and penal procedures 
we find again extraordinary diversity among countries reaching the point of 
cacophony ultimately impeding international cooperation and mutual legal 
assistance. Some jurisdictions quickly adopted U.N. model laws, while oth-
ers employed their own methods or merely extended money laundering pro-
visions to cover CFT. The national regimes vary with respect to the range of 
activities and groups covered, the types of assets or financial activities in-
cluded, the origin of funds raised to finance terrorist acts, the intent or 
knowledge of individuals, whether they target the financing of an activity, 
act or group, etc. 
Japan does not define specifically either terrorism or terrorist fi-
nance. Instead, the conduct is covered by the criminalization of the act of 
offering or collecting funds in order to assist others for committing certain 
offences such as murder in order to threaten a public, national or local go-
verning body. 
Several countries have provisions specifically about the offense of 
terrorism finance. Argentina’s penal code defines the offense as the act of 
collecting and providing goods or funds with the knowledge that they will 
be used in whole or in part to finance a terrorist group described in penal 
code article 213, or a member of these groups for the commission of a ter-
rorist act.26
Belgium’s penal code goes beyond goods and funds to include also 
the provision of information, material goods to a terrorist group or any form 
of funding an activity of a terrorist group, with the knowledge that such 
participation contributes to the commission of a crime or offense by that 
terrorist group.27 In addition to this offense of financing a particular terrorist 
group, the Belgian penal code also criminalizes the provision of material 
goods or financing of a specific terrorist offense.28
The French penal code equates terrorism finance with acts of terror-
ism and covers goods, funds and information in its definition; it also re-
26 Cód. Pen. art. 213 (Arg.).  
27 Code Pén. art. 140 § 1 (Belg.).  
28 Code Pén. art. 141 (Belg.). 
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quires knowledge that these are meant to be used for the commission of an 
act of terrorism, even if that acts is not eventually committed.29
Germany offers no definition of the financing of terrorism and its 
laws do not provide a separate crime for the financing of terrorism. The 
financing of terrorism is considered as one possible type of terrorist activity 
punishable as participation in or support of a terrorist group.30 Italy also 
treats this offense as participation in terrorism. 
The U.S. has a set of statutes covering “material support of terror-
ism” and what constitutes a terrorist act.31 Material support covers anyone 
who: “provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the 
nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, 
knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carry-
ing out . . . ” a long list of offenses.32 Further, “material support or re-
sources” means “any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including 
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, 
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documenta-
tion or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or 
include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious mate-
rials.”33 This has been criticized as overly inclusive in law review articles as 
well as in court with some success and more cases pending. 
On the other extreme, terrorist financing in Brazil is punishable if 
treated as participation in terrorism, as defined in article twenty-nine of the 
Penal Code, which addresses conspiracy among persons.34 Thus, it must be 
shown that the provision of resources to a terrorist or terrorist group is di-
rectly related to a terrorist act. Hence, material and indirect participation 
depends, on the initiation or the execution of a terrorist act. Brazilian au-
29 See C. PÉN. art. 421-2-2 (Fr.). 
30 Strfgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt, § 129a (F.R.G.) 
(stating that participation in a terrorist group is punishable, even without the commission of a 
terrorist act). 
31 See Cleveland Preparatory Colloquium, International Association of Penal Law, INT’L
REV. OF PENAL L., Vol. 79, Nos. 3 & 4 (2008), available at http://www.penal.org (subscrip-
tion only). 
32 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (a) (West 2009). 
33 Id. § 2339A (b), declared unconstitutional in part by Humanitarian Law Project v. 
Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding bans on providing “training” and “service 
to designated foreign terrorist organizations were impermissibly vague and “other specialized 
knowledge” portion of ban on providing “expert advice or assistance” was also void for 
vagueness).   
34 Código Penal [C.P.] art. 29 (Braz.). 
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thors strongly criticize this arrangement, which may also violate constitu-
tional standards.35
The bulk of CFT measures is based on previous anti-money laun-
dering measures, even when the two offenses are defined clearly differently. 
De facto neglected in this process are the following:  
A growing consensus that terrorism finance and money launder-
ing activities often involve very different activities, especially 
with respect to the volume of funds involved;  
That different aims underlie social responses to each (e.g., com-
bating serious crime by depriving offenders of their illicit assets 
compared to prevention of terrorism through reduction of material 
support for it and information gathering); and  
A growing unease about the balance of benefits and costs of 
AML policies that gradually became an end in itself, rather than 
an instrument against serious crime. 
In essence, the problem is that measures with debatable capacity to 
undermine criminal enterprises seeking to hide the origin of voluminous
criminal proceeds have been applied to the usually much smaller amounts 
involved in terrorist operations.36
Rules regarding corporate criminal liability range from absence of 
such provisions in the national legal system (e.g., in Germany) and limited 
applications (as in Brazilian law, where corporate entities have such liability 
only in relation to environmental crimes) to full corporate criminal liability 
(e.g., in the United States).37
Historically, sanctions against politically motivated offenders have 
gone through phases characterized by a regime de faveur, when they were 
considered as aristocrats of delinquency and respected for their strong ideo-
logical commitments, to a regime de rigueur, as these offenders started be-
ing handled as terrorists.38 The possible penalties against terrorism finance 
vary widely and range from five months to life imprisonment in the event of 
conviction, while it remains uncertain and unknown how long offenders 
35 Carlos Eduardo Adriano Japiassú & Fauzi Hassan Choukr, Brazil National Report: 
Cleveland Preparatory Colloquium, 79 INT’L REV. OF PENAL L. (annex) 59–71 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.penal.org (subscription only). 
36 This refers mainly to the operational costs of terrorist activities. This is different from 
the operating costs of large and established terrorist groups that control certain geographic 
areas and perform quasi government functions. 
37 See also Law No. 25.246, art. 24 (Arg.) (describing how natural and legal persons can 
be held responsible for not reporting unusual or suspicious activities to the FIU, but only 
natural persons can be held responsible for terrorism financing).  
38 Nikkos Passas, Political Crime and Political Offender: Theory and Practice, 8 
LIVERPOOL L. REV. 23, 26 (1986). 
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actually serve. In Austria, financing of terrorism is punishable by impri-
sonment from sixth months to five years. In Brazil, deprivation of liberty 
ranges from three to ten years. If the result of the offense is grave bodily 
injury, the penalty can be increased to twice that length, and if it results in 
death, it can be increased by three times. In Belgium, the length is five to 
ten years. In Japan, the maximum penalty for “offering or collecting funds 
in order to assist others for committing certain offences” is either ten years 
imprisonment with forced labor or a fine of ten million yen. In the United 
States, penalties are fines and/or imprisonment for a period of up to fifteen 
years for each violation, and if death of any person results, for any term of 
years or for life.39
Statutes of limitation are generally very long. In Brazil, there is ac-
tually no statute of limitation at all for this offense. In the United States, the 
time count starts at the point only when the facts of the offense are discov-
ered.
The treatment of victims of terrorism is also diverse. In Argentina, 
for example, the procedure for compensation or reparation of victims is 
decided ex post facto. In Austria, victims of terrorism are entitled to com-
pensation under the general provisions of the Act on Victims of Crime. In 
general, countries do not report any provisions for the use of confiscated 
assets for victim compensation. In Belgium, victims have the right to make 
their claims alongside penal procedures in terrorism cases or to pursue the 
civil route. In the United States, the legal system also allows for civil re-
course and victims of terrorist acts overseas have brought civil actions suc-
cessfully. 
Finally, some reports point out the importance of context and illu-
strate how old laws introduced to address different problems may not be 
appropriate or adequate today. On example were the U.S. provisions against 
Nelson Mandela, which were drafted long after he was released from prison 
and became a well respect African leader. Brazil’s National Security Law is 
another example. This law reflects the context of the military dictatorship at 
the beginning of the 1980s, when the primary concerns and priorities were 
rather different from contemporary ones. 
As a result of the issues discussed above, there are well-grounded 
calls for careful reconsideration of the problems and reforms or adjustments 
of national laws. 
39 See National Reports of Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Japan, and the United States, Cleve-
land Preparatory Colloquium, 79 INT’L REV. OF PENAL L. (annex) (2008), available at
http://www.penal.org (subscription only). 
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B.  Penal Procedure 
The pace of creating new counter-terrorism financial regulatory and 
enforcement measures has been brisk and mainly has emanated from the 
executive branch. The legislative, administrative, and judicial processes 
have struggled to keep pace and to provide a fair process in determining 
whether all actions are effective, based on solid evidence, fairly and consis-
tently enforced. 
One matter that preoccupied the authors of many national reports is 
the designation process of suspects of terrorism under United Nations, Eu-
ropean Union or national processes. The areas of focus revolve around the 
applicable standards, the procedures used domestically for enforcement and 
the procedures for de-listing those against whom no sufficient evidence has 
surfaced. This is particularly sensitive given that most of the designations 
are not done on the initiative or evidence produced by a domestic authority 
but through international organizations with little insight as to the inner 
workings and criteria.  
As noted earlier, the listing process is administrative in nature and 
preventive in its objectives, yet the consequences for those affected by the 
measures are often harsher than for those convicted of serious criminal of-
fenses. The process has become controversial with legal challenges under-
way in national courts as well as before the European Court of Justice relat-
ing to due process, transparency and right of appeal. The European Union 
report summarizes several cases, comprehensively addresses many critical 
issues at that regional level as well as the implementation of United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions relative to terrorism finance,40 so these will 
not be repeated here. Noteworthy, however, is that these are not formalistic 
actions. They concern substance, justice, and avoidance of harm to innocent 
parties. As the United States and Hungarian national reports clearly illu-
strate, there have been several errors and lack of evidence in the past raising 
justified concerns throughout the international community and undermining 
the legitimacy of the overall endeavor to strengthen security. 
The Belgian report has confirmed how keen the government is to 
meet its international obligations through swift action but without external 
supervision and controls. Notable is a legal case cited in this report, where-
by the Belgian government was ordered to do the necessary for the removal 
of two names from the designation list. 
Administrative and executive units are generally responsible for the 
implementation and enforcement of TF measures. In Japan, this is the task 
of a special administrative committee composed of senior officials from 
40 See Council Common Position (EC) No. 931/2001 of 27 Dec. 2001, 2001 O.J. (L. 234) 
93. See also Council Regulation 881/2002, 2002 O.J. (139) 9. 
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various Ministries (e.g., Justice, Finance, Foreign Affairs, the Economy, 
Trade, and Industry). 
The Austrian designation implementation illustrates how most 
countries proceed: measures against suspects appearing on lists related to 
U.N. Resolutions are taken on the basis of administrative regulations of the 
Austrian National Bank. There is no judicial process and no judicial reme-
dy. “Inner-European” terrorism (e.g., Northern Ireland and Basque areas) is 
addressed through a coordination process on the European Union level in 
the framework of the Common External and Security Policy which leads to 
common positions concerning the listing of names or groups whose assets 
are to be frozen by member states. 
In the United States, several federal agencies are in charge of the 
designation process, but there are no official/publicly available standards on 
how precisely they operate and employ a “reasonable cause” standard. In-
formation has often turned out to be incomplete or erroneous, which has 
caused implementation and compliance difficulties for the financial sector 
as well as other countries called upon to sanction the same persons. As the 
U.S. report notes:
In 1998, OFAC [the Office of Foreign Asset Controls] issued, but then less 
than one year later withdrew a regulation providing for the right to review 
the factual basis or reasons for the initial blacklisting decision. Apparently, 
OFAC’s withdrawal was based partly upon a concern for protecting intel-
ligence sources and methods. Although parties can still request that a 
blacklisting decision be administratively reconsidered, they no longer have 
a regulatory right to review the basis for the agency’s actions.  
The report summarizes cases where mistaken identities and unfounded sus-
picions led to drastic but regrettable action against individual and organiza-
tional actors. 
In the United States, actions have also stirred controversy when it 
was discovered that national and international laws were violated by the 
surveillance and monitoring of SWIFT fund transfer messages as well as 
electronic and telephonic communications.41
Hungary also reports cases where mistakes were made. In one in-
stance, a case was dropped because of the lack of good evidence—that is, 
the case was based on allegations made by a person with a criminal/police 
record and two previous extraditions from Hungary. 
Finally, the question about extraordinary and emergency measures 
in pursuit of counter-terrorism policies struck a sensitive cord and lively 
debate and arguments in the reports as well as the Cleveland colloquium. 
Authors of the national reports were unanimous in condemning the violation 
 41 See Bruce Zagaris, supra note 18. 
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of human rights, including the use of torture, double standards, reversal of 
burden of proof, etc., some of which are specifically prohibited by their own 
constitutions too. 
Most countries provide for special investigative techniques, secret 
surveillance or undercover investigations. All reports underline the impor-
tance of prior authorization of exceptional measures and proper supervision 
in order to avoid fishing expeditions and unnecessary violations of citizens’ 
privacy rights. 
VI. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
The international cooperation against terrorism, including the 
finance of terrorism, has been quite extraordinary since September 2001. 
Nevertheless, thorny issues remain, particularly with respect to the appro-
priate use of intelligence that cannot be shared by national governments. 
The past errors, examples of draconian measures despite the lack of suffi-
cient or shareable evidence, due process and transparency questions, viola-
tions of national and international laws by government agencies combine 
with the absence of universal definition of terrorism and terrorist group to 
render international cooperation less than fully effective and smooth. 
National provisions against extradition or mutual legal assistance in 
cases deemed to be of political nature may continue to frustrate requesting 
States, despite the acceptance of the general principle aut dedere, aut judi-
care.
National standards for extradition or mutual legal assistance still 
vary a great deal,42 but it is hoped that recent U.N. conventions against ter-
rorism, financing of terrorism, transnational organized crime, and corruption 
will be implemented effectively and thereby improve the understanding of 
how different legal systems work and bolster significantly international co-
operation (the latter two U.N. conventions contain very comprehensive in-
ternational cooperation provisions). 
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, while virtually all agree on the necessity of financial 
controls against terrorism, the current patchwork of regulatory arrangements 
leaves plenty of room for improvement. Many of the national laws and 
measures against the finance of terrorism is driven by external and interna-
tional institutions, the approaches are inconsistent and asymmetrical, the 
procedures and processes are non-transparent, the criteria are unclear, pre-
ventive and temporary measures last for extended periods of time and have 
42 Austria, for instance, generally acts upon mere requests containing a statement of facts, 
without evidence requirements; Brazil has detailed requirements on extradition but virtually 
none for mutual legal assistance. 
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severe impact on those subject to them, errors have been made repeatedly 
and disagreements on who is and who is not a terrorist are unlikely to be 
resolved in the immediate future. 
Importantly, there is no systematic and valid knowledge on precise-
ly how different countries go about controlling the finance of terrorism and 
how effective they are. The international community still does not have a 
good overall picture of the methods terrorist groups use, their needs, how 
they shift their modus operandi in response to counter-terrorism, and how 
different funding mechanisms are (or are not) accessible to specific groups 
or ideological/religious orientations. In other words, we do not know exact-
ly what the nature of terrorism finance is, how countries and regions target 
it, how we can offer better guidance to the private sector whose cooperation 
is vital, and how to improve the effectiveness of our social and legal con-
trols.
In this light, we can all agree that the systematic research and data-
base recommended in the section of “empirical aspects” may offer the in-
sights and solid grounds on which policy can be constructed, legitimacy can 
be strengthened and security can be enhanced. As academics and scholars, 
we have the duty to pursue and participate in this critical project. 
